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*Ent. L.R. 36 Introduction
The Human Rights Act 1998 gives direct effect in this jurisdiction to the most significant Articles of the
European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”).1 It is likely to enter fully into force before the
middle of the year 2000. Much of the public debate during the Human Rights Bill's passage through
Parliament concerned the potential conflict between “privacy” and “freedom of expression” to which it
could give rise. In particular, representatives of the media expressed the fear that incorporation of
Article 8 of the ECHR (protecting inter alia “private life”) will lead to the introduction of a legal right to
protect privacy in this jurisdiction.2
In response, the Government put forward an amendment to the Bill at a relatively late stage in its
legislative progress. This amendment was accepted and resulted in the introduction of section 12,
which expressly instructs courts to “have particular regard” to the right to freedom of expression.
During the parliamentary debates on the amendment, the Home Secretary sought to offer
reassurance to the media. He claimed that the effect of section 12 would be to require courts to take
account of “the extent to which [the European Court of Human Rights] has come down in favour of
press freedom as opposed to privacy.”3
It is our purpose in this article to examine whether or not such reassurance is well founded and to ask
whether section 12 will prove effective in alleviating media concern about the development of a right
to privacy.4 We focus upon situations in which the arguments in favour of legal protection for privacy
are most compelling. We are not interested in the private lives of Bill Clinton or Peter Mandelson.
Rather, we are concerned with cases in which an assertion of a “right to privacy” is made on behalf of
individuals with no evident “public” significance. If section 12 is effective in preventing such individuals
from bringing claims of infringement of privacy, it will a fortiori be effective in preventing actions
brought by public figures where arguments in favour of disclosure of information are much stronger.
An example of such a compelling case was provided by Clive Soley M.P. during the parliamentary
debate on section 12. He reminded the Commons of the plight of an individual whom we shall call “X”.
In January 1998, X's father, who was a helicopter winchman, rescued nine people from a sinking
freighter off the Shetland Islands. Following the rescue of the final person, he was swept to his death.
In the wake of these events, the press made repeated attempts to interview X and publicise his
situation. He was driven to make a public plea to be allowed to grieve in peace.5 It seems unlikely that
any existing legal remedy would have enabled him to prevent this invasion of his privacy.6 In future,
will the Human Rights Act allow those in similar situations to obtain legal redress against the press or
other media?7
Does Article 8 “cover” unwanted media attention?
In order to answer this question, we must first establish whether disclosure of details about personal
relationships and emotional reactions are actually “covered” by Article 8.8 This Article provides that:
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is
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in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national
security, public safety or the economic wellbeing of the country, for the prevention of disorder or
crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
Someone in the position of X is most likely to claim that they have suffered an interference with their
*Ent. L.R. 37 “private life”.9 This phrase has been interpreted in a particularly creative way at
Strasbourg. The European Court of Human Rights (hereafter “the European Court”) has accepted that
the criminalisation of consensual homosexual intercourse10 or the denial of access to personal
records11 can in certain circumstances infringe Article 8.
In addition, the Article covers matters which fall within the more restricted scope of the Anglo-Saxon
notion of a “right to privacy”, i.e. the right to object to the unwanted obtaining and disclosure of
personal information. For example in Malone v. United Kingdom , the European Court held that the
tapping of the applicant's telephone without his knowledge or consent constituted a breach of Article
8.12 In that case, it was not simply telephone tapping which was found to constitute an interference for
the purposes of Article 8. The disclosure of information derived from the “metering” of the applicant's
telephone was also covered.13 There is little doubt that the form of unwanted publicity suffered by X
would constitute an interference with “private life” for the purposes of the European Court.
Any such interference will therefore only be justifiable if done in pursuit of any of the purposes set out
in Article 8(2). A journalist or newspaper proprietor's right to freedom of expression will, in the majority
of cases, be covered by the legitimate aim of “the protection of the rights or freedoms of others” within
Article 8(2). However, it is only where interference with an individual's private life is “necessary in a
democratic society” that it will be justifiable under Article 8(2). The existence of such necessity will
hinge upon the strengths of the respective parties' competing rights. As an individual in X's position
would seem to have a strong privacy claim in this context, much would hinge upon the strength of any
countervailing right to freedom of expression. Indeed, the counterbalancing weight of the media's
claim to freedom of expression is at the heart of the issue considered in this article.
However, prior to exploring it further, we need to pause to investigate an important procedural
question. Would someone in X's position actually be able to bring proceedings under the Human
Rights Act? Would, for example, a newspaper in private ownership be bound by the Act? In other
words, would the Act have “horizontal” as well as “vertical” effect? This is an issue which has excited
considerable and divergent comment over the last few months.14
An applicant to Strasbourg can only bring an action against a state High Contracting party to the
ECHR.15 This suggests that only public bodies have to comply with the protected rights. However, the
situation is more complex than that. The requirement to “respect” the rights protected by Article 8 has
been interpreted by the European Court to include an obligation upon states in certain circumstances
to ensure that their laws adequately secure the protected rights against private parties.16 This is likely
to extend to require a state to regulate media activities interfering with the interests protected by
Article 8.17 In addition, the drafting of the Human Rights Act raises the possibility that it will have an
impact upon private as well as public media organisations. Section 6 of the Act states that: “It is
unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right.” This
provision may allow someone in a situation like that of X to rely upon Article 8 in a number of different
ways.
First, it is possible that certain media bodies, such as the BBC, will be “public authorities” in their own
right and will therefore be committing an unlawful act if they interfere with an individual's private life,
for example by broadcasting intimate details of a subject's personal history, without justification.
Secondly, it is also likely that media watchdog bodies, such as the Press Complaints Commission, will
be “public authorities” for the purposes of the Act and consequently will also be bound to “respect” the
private lives of complainants in arriving at their decisions. Thirdly, it is arguable that the Human Rights
Act will have a “horizontal” impact by virtue of the inclusion of courts within the definition of a “public
authority”.18 It can be argued that courts will therefore be obliged to respect the “private life” of parties
in any case, even in litigation between private parties. A plaintiff such as X may invite a court to
develop the common law in such a way as to secure his or her privacy. If a court were to refuse this
invitation, it may be possible to argue that the court itself had failed to respect his or her interest under
Article 8 and had therefore acted unlawfully.19
*Ent. L.R. 38 On balance, it would seem that the media have reasonable grounds for fearing that the
Human Rights Act could lead to a “right to privacy”. Disclosure of intimate personal facts would
appear to be “covered” by Article 8 and it is strongly arguable that breaches of that Article will be
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actionable against both public and private bodies. How then is it possible to explain repeated
governmental assurances that incorporation of the ECHR will not lead to a “back-door” right to
privacy?20 These appear to be based upon the belief that the media's own rights to freedom of
expression, protected by Article 10 of the ECHR, will be sufficient to prevent such a development. As
will be seen, it is this belief which underlies section 12.
Human Rights Act 1998, section 12
Section 12 will apply whenever:
a court is considering whether to grant any relief which, if granted, might affect the exercise of the
Convention right to freedom of expression.21
The detailed requirements of “the Convention right to freedom of expression” (i.e. of Article 10) are
considered below.22 First, however, it is significant to note that section 12 is expressly intended to
apply whenever a court is considering a case giving rise to issues of freedom of expression, i.e. even
if the parties are all private individuals or bodies.23 In such a case, certain procedural safeguards for
the media are introduced. Ex parte injunctions are prohibited save in the most exceptional of
circumstances.24 In any event, under section 12(2), interlocutory injunctions are not to be made on
ordinary American Cyanamid principles.25 Section 12(3) provides that:
Norelief is to be granted so as to restrain publication before trial unless the court is satisfied that the
applicant is likely to establish that publication should not be allowed.
This is likely to assuage fears of ambush by “gagging” order. However, it is the impact of the
substantive protection provided by section 12 which is most interesting. Indeed, given that, under
section 12(3), the decision on the award of an interlocutory injunction is to depend upon the likelihood
of success in a final hearing, the Act's procedural protection is based upon this substantive protection
for freedom of expression. Section 12(4) states that:
The court must have particular regard to the importance of the Convention right to freedom of
expression and, where the proceedings relate to material which the respondent claims, or which
appears to the court, to be journalistic, literary or artistic material (or to conduct connected with such
material), to--
(a) the extent to which--
(i) the material has, or is about to, become available to the public; or
(ii) it is, or would be in the public interest for the material to be published;
(b) any relevant privacy code.
Subsection 12(4)(a)(i) is likely to discourage courts from repeating the Spycatcher fiasco by awarding
an injunction against the disclosure of information already in the public domain.26 However,
subsections 12(4)(a)(i) and 12(4)(b) introduce requirements which are unlikely to be of much
assistance to courts faced with a difficult conflict between freedom of expression and private life.
There are privacy codes for all main forms of media but they are subject to extensive exceptions in
favour of the “public interest”.27 Courts are unlikely to consider themselves to be bound by subsection
12(4)(b) to take account of the decisions of the regulatory bodies on the interpretation of the codes.
The requirement in subsection 12(4)(a)(ii) to pay particular regard to the extent to which it would be
“in the public interest for material to be published” is likely to be similarly unhelpful without further
theoretical consideration of the conflict of public interests in a “privacy” case. The common law
defence of “public interest” has, to date, generally been used as a justification for permitting the
publication of details revealing criminal or wrongful conduct,28 of information of vital importance to
public safety or liberty29 or of hypocrisy.30 It is a notoriously indeterminate defence and is not, as it
stands, likely to provide courts with a useful tool for negotiating the difficult conflict between the right
to a “private life” and the right to freedom of expression.
The most significant feature of section 12(4) is likely to be its general stipulation that courts must
“have particular regard to the importance of the Convention right to freedom of expression”. In a case
such as those under consideration here, this provision will force courts to confront the meaning of
“freedom of expression”, and of the relationship between that right and the right to a “private life”, in a
more systematic way than hitherto. They will be required to do this within a framework provided by the
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ECHR. It is our purpose in the remainder of this article to consider whether this enforced enterprise is
likely to secure the interests of *Ent. L.R. 39 the media against plaintiffs claiming infringement of
privacy. What then is meant by an obligation to pay “particular regard” to Article 10?
“Particular regard”?
This phrase clearly does not oblige a court expressly to favour freedom of expression over the
protection of privacy; i.e. to prefer Article 10 above Article 8. A proposed amendment in those terms
was rejected in favour of section 12.31 In any event, such an inflexible elevation of one fundamental
right over another would surely itself be incompatible with the Convention. The intention behind the
provision seems rather to emphasise the particular significance that the European Court has granted
to freedom of expression by comparison with the interest in “private life”.32
In announcing the Government's intention to table the amendment, the Home Secretary stated that
his department had produced a document containing an abstract of relevant cases decided at
Strasbourg.33 He claimed that this document, which was available in the Commons Library,
demonstrated “the extent to which [the European Court of Human Rights] has come down in favour of
press freedom as opposed to privacy and the right to family life”.34 He added:
It is always the case that some legal concepts have greater force than others; it happens to be the
case that the European Court has given much greater weight to [A]rticle 10 rights to freedom of
expression than to [A]rticle 8 rights to privacy. We want to reflect that in our domestic law.35
These remarks support the impression that section 12(4) is intended simply to draw courts' attention
to the European Court's tendency to value Article 10 more highly than Article 8 when the two rights
are in conflict.
However, the remarks are certainly not supported by the document to which the Home Secretary
referred. It demonstrates no such preference. This is not surprising because the European Court has
not yet considered the conflict between Article 8 and Article 10 in the context of media activity.
Several applications to the European Commission of Human Rights (hereafter “the Commission”)
claiming a violation of Article 8 arising from press activity have raised this issue and some are noted
in the document.36 These claims have generally been declared inadmissible on procedural grounds37
or because of the availability of remedies against false allegations in the domestic law.38 None
however have been decided in a way which can reasonably be regarded as demonstrating a
preference for Article 10 over Article 8.
In Winer v. The United Kingdom ,39 the Commission stated only that, in establishing whether a state
has a positive obligation to protect against invasions of privacy by private parties, “Article 10 must be
taken into account”.40 Indeed, in the admissibility decision in Earl Spencer and Countess Spencer v.
United Kingdom , the Commission went so far as to state that it:
would not exclude that the absence of an actionable remedy in relation to the publications of which
the applicants complain could show a lack of respect for their private lives. It has regard in this
respect to the duties and responsibilities that are carried with the right to freedom of expression
guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention and to the Contracting States' obligation to provide a
measure of protection to the right of privacy of an individual affected by others' exercise of their
freedom of expression.41
Despite the Home Secretary's claims, the Strasbourg jurisprudence shows no clear preference for
Article 10 over Article 8. Accordingly, domestic courts seeking to resolve any apparent conflict
between the rights will have to explore in greater detail the meaning of “freedom of expression” and
“private life” and their respective values in a particular case. As a plaintiff in X's position has a strong
privacy claim and as section 12 is expressly concerned with freedom of expression, much is likely to
depend upon the precise weight to be accorded to the expression interest in any particular
circumstances. It is to this issue that we now turn.
*Ent. L.R. 40 The requirements of Article 10
The “Convention right to freedom of expression” is contained in Article 10:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions
and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and
regardless of frontiers
Page4
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to
such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a
democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the
reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or
for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.
Paragraph 10(1) has been interpreted widely by the European Court. It has been held to cover forms
of expression as diverse as written political criticism,42 graphic artistic works,43 and commercial
speech.44 This broad interpretation has been possible, in part, because the right is not protected in
absolute terms. As in the case of Article 8, Article 10 permits interference in defined circumstances. In
particular, paragraph 10(2) gives national authorities power to restrict the exercise of freedom of
expression for the “protection of therights of others”. Such rights could, for example, include rights
under Article 8. Any such restrictions are permissible only in so far as they are “prescribed by law”
and are “necessary in a democratic society”. However, within this broad range of expression covered
by Article 10, there exists a variable standard of protection depending on the type of speech involved.
The extent to which the European Court has been willing to permit interference with freedom of
expression has depended greatly upon the extent to which the particular claim to protection under
Article 10 conforms with the fundamental reasons or justifications for the right of freedom of
expression.
Several such justifications have been offered over the last 150 years.45 Foremost amongst these have
been the justifications from truth,46 self-fulfilment and democracy. At Strasbourg, emphasis has been
placed on the latter two justifications.47 The justification from self-fulfilment48 asserts that the freedom
both to impart and receive ideas and arguments is a vital part of each individual's right to
self-development and fulfilment. People will only be able to maximise their potential as human beings
if they are free to express, and have expressed to them, ideas, beliefs and arguments. This
justification has its greatest relevance in cases of artistic or cultural expression. It is obviously of
limited application in a case such as X's where it is difficult to comprehend how self-fulfilment might
be derived by a journalist from reporting on the personal grief of X.
The justification from democracy has been the philosophical foundation most relied upon by the
European Court.49 In its historical origins, it is particularly associated with Alexander Meiklejohn.50 He
argued that, in all democracies, ultimate sovereignty rests with the people and that the state is run on
the principle of popular representative self-government. In order for this system to work effectively, it
is vital that a free flow of information and ideas exists so that the people can make fully informed
decisions. Without this, the sovereign body will be inhibited in carrying out its task, the deliberative
process will be impaired and democracy will suffer. Freedom of the press is a vital element in this
process and therefore is also of crucial importance.
The European Court's reliance upon the justification from democracy has caused it to be particularly
sensitive to interferences with what could be broadly described as political expression. For example,
in Castells v. Spain the European Court stated that:
Freedom of the press affords the public one of the best means of discovering and forming an opinion
of the ideas and attitudes of their political leaders. In particular it gives politicians the opportunity to
reflect and comment on the preoccupations of public opinion; it thus enables everyone to participate
in the free political debate which is at the very core of the concept of a democratic society.”51
The vital “public watchdog” role of the press has also frequently been noted:
[I]t isincumbent on [the press] to impart information and ideas on matters of public interest. Not only
does it have the task of imparting such information and ideas: the public also has a right to receive
them. Were it otherwise the press would be unable to play its role of public watchdog.52
*Ent. L.R. 41 The extent to which a particular claim to the right to freedom of expression accords with
the justification from democracy will be highly significant in establishing the strength of that claim
under Article 10. As we have seen, the strength of the claim ought, in turn, to determine whether or
not it prevails over an assertion of the right to respect for private life.
Which particular claims to the right to freedom of expression will benefit from this high level of
protection bestowed by the justification from democracy? On a narrow definition, we may simply
include speech relating to the actual processes of government and the public roles of the actors
therein. Nevertheless, while the justification from democracy may have its greatest impact in cases of
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narrowly political speech, it could certainly be argued to cover a much wider range of expression. The
citizen requires information about many different issues of general public concern in order to exercise
his or her democratic responsibilities. These could include, for example, information relating to the
administration of justice, the running of public companies, the environment and privatised utilities.
The European Court's decisions seem to favour a definition extending beyond the narrowly political.
For example, the case of Thorgeir Thorgeirson v. Iceland concerned a journalist's newspaper articles
alleging brutality by members of the Reykjavjik police force.53 Thorgeirson was found guilty of criminal
defamation by the Icelandic court. On an application to Strasbourg under Article 10, the Icelandic
government argued, inter alia , that:
[T]he wide limits of acceptable criticism in political discussion did not apply to the same extent in the
discussion of other matters of public interest. The issues of public interest raised by the applicant's
articles could not be included in the category of political discussion, which denoted direct or indirect
participation by citizens in the decision-making process in a democratic society.54
The Court roundly rejected this argument and stated that:
[T]here [was] no warrant in [the European Court's] case law for distinguishing between political
discussion and discussion of other matters of public concern.55
Thus, while it is apparent that it is the justification from democracy that gives a special position to
freedom of expression and of the press, the Strasbourg Court has not been restricted to an
interpretation that is narrowly political.56 How far then do “matters of public concern” extend? In
particular, to what extent could the events surrounding someone like X constitute matters of public
concern?
Certainly, if a narrowly political definition were to be adopted, the court would conclude that the
reporting of the grief of X could have no relevance to the governmental process. It would not therefore
be deserving of a high level of protection. If, as seems likely, a wider definition is used, this will still
not provide a strong justification for the media's activities in X's case. It could be argued by the press
that the circumstances of the tragedy itself may be matters of legitimate public concern, but it would
surely be to stretch this argument beyond breaking point to claim that the private sorrow of X could be
encompassed within the ambit of “public interest”. If our courts recognise the theoretical basis
provided for Article 10 in the Strasbourg case law (as they are required to do by section 2 of the
Human Rights Act), it is difficult to see how they could find that X's personal tragedy falls within the
scope of the principle, even in its most widely drawn form.
Conclusion
The rhetoric of the debate on section 12 in Parliament and in the media suggests general acceptance
that the development of a right to privacy has been successfully forestalled. Lord Wakeham, on behalf
of the Press Complaints Commission, is reported to have said of the amendment: “I warmly welcome
it--as I know does the newspaper industry--and I am grateful for the skilful way the Government has
dealt with the potential problems.”57
The clear impression fostered by the Home Secretary in the House of Commons was that, in the
jurisprudence of the European Court, Article 10 always takes precedence over Article 8 and,
accordingly, that the media has little to fear from the Human Rights Act. On closer analysis, this
confidence seems misplaced. In a case of unwanted media attention, the subject of attention could
well have a strong claim deriving from Article 8. Article 10 can only then “take precedence” where the
subject is a legitimate subject of public concern. The protection offered to the media by section 12
could prove to be rhetorical rather than real.
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